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I. Introduction 
Petitioner-Appellant, H-Hook, LLC (hereinafter "H-Hook"), seeks to have this Court set 
aside the August 29, 2011, decision of the Payette County Board of County Commissioners ( the 
"Board") granting a conditional rezone (a rezone conditioned by a development agreement) 
requested by Alternate Energy Holdings, Inc. (hereinafter "AEHI"). The granting of the 
conditional rezone should be set aside for the following reasons: 
1. The rezone granted by Payette County (hereinafter the "County") is invalid 
because it was not granted in accordance with a valid Comprehensive Plan. Payette County's 
Comprehensive Plan is not valid because it fails to include all of the elements required for 
inclusion by LC. § 67-6508. 
2. The rezone granted by Payette County (hereinafter the "County") constitutes 
illegal spot zoning, both Type One and Type Two. The rezone is illegal Type One spot zoning 
because it rezoned the subject property for a use prohibited by the original zoning classification 
that was not in accordance with the Comprehensive Plan. The rezone is illegal Type Two spot 
zoning because the zoning change singled out a parcel of land for use inconsistent with the 
permitted use in the rest of the zoning district for the benefit of an individual property owner. 
3. The proceedings conducted by the County were fundamentally unfair to H-Hook 
and deprived H-Hook of its due process rights. Among the defects in the proceedings conducted 
by the County was the County's failure to make the development agreement available for public 
review on a timely basis thereby preventing H-Hook from having a meaningful opportunity to 
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review and present informed written comment and testimony concemmg the development 
agreement. 
Any or all of the above reasons form sufficient basis for the Court to set aside the 
County's decision. 
II. The Rezone is Invalid Because it is Based upon an Invalid Comprehensive Plan 
The conditional rezone approved by the Board in this matter is invalid and should be set 
aside because the County's Comprehensive Plan, with which the rezone must conform, is 
invalid. The County's Comprehensive Plan is invalid because it does not include all of the 
elements required for inclusion by I.C. § 67-6508. The missing element is set forth in 
subsection (h) of that section and requires all comprehensive plans to include an analysis 
showing general plans for public services, facilities and utilities, including power plant sites and 
utility transmission corridors. The missing element is significant in this case because the 
conditional rezone granted by the Board was for the express purpose of approving the 
development of AEHI's proposed nuclear power plant project. Agency Record (Ag. R.) p. 
4137-4160; 4098-4136. 
In their joint brief, the County and AEHI (hereinafter collectively referred to as 
"Respondents") first attempt to characterize H-Hook's position that the conditional rezone is 
invalid as being a challenge to the County's Comprehensive Plan. And, since this Court has 
previously determined that a challenge to an amendment to a comprehensive plan may not be 
pursued through a petition for judicial review, Respondents, in a footnote, suggest the Court has 
no jurisdiction to consider the issue. That argument should be rejected for two reasons. First, 
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H-Hook does not, by this action, challenge the County's Comprehensive Plan as adopted in 2006 
or as amended in 2010 in an attempt to accommodate the conditional rezone. This is a challenge 
to the rezone itself under this Court's holding in Sprenger, Grubb & Associates, Inc. v. City of 
Hailey, 133 Idaho 320, 986 P.2d 343 (1999). There, the court held that a zone change adopted 
by the City of Hailey was invalid where the City's comprehensive plan failed to conform to the 
requirements of LC. § 67-6508, holding: "A valid comprehensive plan is a precondition to the 
validity of zoning ordinances." 133 Idaho at 321. This action fits squarely within the holding of 
Sprenger, Grubb. Respondents cite no cases overruling or even questioning the holding in 
Sprenger, Grubb. 
Two of the cases Respondents do cite in their Brief at footnote 5 on page li have no 
bearing on the right to judicial review of the granting of a conditional rezone. In those cases, the 
petitioners sought to have the court overturn an adopted amendment to a county's comprehensive 
plan, which the court declined to do. That is not the relief sought in this case, however. Here, the 
relief sought is to overturn the granting of a conditional rezone. The third case cited by 
Respondents, Taylor v. Canyon County Bd. of Com 'rs, 147 Idaho 424, 210 P.3d 532 (2009), in 
addition to holding that there is no right to judicial review of a comprehensive plan amendment, 
also holds that judicial review is available to challenge a conditional rezone because the action 
authorizes development to proceed without further action of the Board. Regardless of the 
holdings in those cases, however, judicial review of actions on applications for conditional 
1 Giltner Dairy, LLC v. Jerome County, 145 Idaho 630, 181 P.3d 1238 (2008); Burns Holdings, 
LLC v. Madison County Bd. of County Com 'rs, 147 Idaho 660, 214 P.3d 646 (2009). 
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rezones is specifically authorized by LC.§ 67-6521(1)(a)(iii), as amended in 2010. Thus, this 
court clearly has jurisdiction to consider the issue. 
The Respondents' argument should also be rejected because neither AEHI nor the County 
raised the issue below. Respondents made many arguments in support of the rezone, but not that 
H-Hook's claims were a disguised attack on the County's Comprehensive Plan. This Court has 
repeatedly refused to consider issues raised for the first time before this Court, e.g., Balser v. 
Kootenai County Bd of County Com 'rs, 110 Idaho 3 7, 714 P .2d 6 ( 1986), and should not do so 
now. 
Respondents next argue, as they did before the District Court, that the use of the word 
"general" in LC. § 67-6508(h) requiring the County's Comprehensive Plan to include an analysis 
showing general plans for power plant sites and utility transmission corridors evidences the 
Legislature's intent that local governments "not get caught up in micro-managing these 
elements," and instead be "concerned with main elements rather than limited detail." 
Respondent and Intervenor's Brief, p. 13. Under that standard, Respondents argue, Payette 
County's Comprehensive Plan sufficiently analyzed plans for power plant sites. Respondents' 
approach, however, asks this Court to focus on the word "general" and ignore the actual mandate 
of LC. § 67-6508 which is to "analyze" and "plan". Thus, the problem with Respondents' 
approach is that the County's Comprehensive Plan contains no plans or analysis, general or 
otherwise, for power plant sites and utility transmission corridors. 
Before addressing that issue, however, the record needs to be set straight. In 2010, before 
the County approved AEHl's proposed amendment to the County's Comprehensive Plan Map 
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(the amendment which re-designated the Schwarz Property from Agricultural to Industrial) the 
County did not, as Respondents claim on page 14 of their Brief, "reject" the argument that the 
County's Comprehensive Plan inadequately analyzed and planned for power plant sites. Instead, 
as the record clearly indicates, in response to that challenge, the County issued a blanket 
invitation to the public to suggest language to be added to its Comprehensive Plan to remedy the 
defect. Ag. R. p. 3853-3856; 3863-3868; 3869-3871. The County then adopted an amendment 
to the text of its Comprehensive Plan, proposed by the County Prosecutor, reading: 
"Energy producers who wish to locate electric, gas or other energy production 
facilities in Payette County must apply to the Payette County Planning and 
Zoning Department and each application will be considered on an individual basis 
in accordance in accordance (sic) with the Local Land Use Planning Act 
(LC.§ 67-6500 et seq.) Payette County Code and this plan." 
Ag. R. p. 153-154. Once the Board agreed to amend the text of the Comprehensive Plan, the 
Board went on to approve AEHI's request to amend the Comprehensive Plan Map. Ag. R. 
p. 3871-3872. There can be no doubt that the County amended the text of its Comprehensive 
Plan in an attempt to remedy the defect that was pointed out to it. In spite of the County's efforts 
to remedy the defect, however, the Plan, both before and after its amendment, fails to conform to 
the mandatory requirements of LC. § 67-6508(h). 
Respondents argue that public services, facilities and utilities were extensively covered in 
the County's Comprehensive Plan prior to its amendment and direct the Court's attention to 
pages 55 through 69 of the Plan. Ag. R. p. 4225-4239. In those fifteen pages, contrary to 
Respondents' rather liberal reading of that portion of the Plan ( as set forth on pages 14 through 
16 of their Brief), the topic of power plants gets one sentence-a list of Idaho Power's 
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hydroelectric facilities then providing power in the vicinity of Payette County: "Electricity is 
generated by hydroelectric facilities located at Brownlee, Oxbow, and Hells Canyon Dams on 
the Snake River, adjacent to Washington County." Ag. R. p. 4234. Transmission corridors get 
no mention at all. 
While the County's Comprehensive Plan does indicate that electrical power is available 
to all County residents (Ag. R. p. 4234), that energy use is declining (Ag. R. p. 4236), and that 
electrical power will continue to be offered to all developed portions of the County (Id), in spite 
of Respondents suggestion to the contrary, none of those brief references to the availability and 
consumption of electrical power in any fashion analyzes plans for power plant sites or utility 
transmission corridors. As pointed out in H-Hook's Opening Brief, a statement to which 
H-Hook adheres, the matter of power plant siting is unaddressed. 
Respondents attempt to excuse the County's failure to include any analysis or plans for 
power plant sites and utility transmission corridors in its 2006 Comprehensive Plan by claiming, 
without reference to where in the Plan it so states, that the County concluded that the current 
utility facilities are adequate for the County's needs and therefore there is no need to plan for 
future power plant sites and transmission corridors.2 Respondents then turn the circle in their 
logic by saying that the 2010 amendment to the Comprehensive Plan acknowledges that future 
applications for power plants would be considered in light of the planning efforts already 
2 LC. § 67-6508 does permit required plan components not to be addressed in a comprehensive 
plan if the plan specifies reasons why a particular component is unneeded. Payette County's 
Comprehensive Plan, however, does not specify reasons why analysis of plans for power plant 
sites and utility transmission corridors is unneeded. 
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contained in the County's Comprehensive Plan. In other words, the County's approach to power 
plant and transmission corridor planning should be summarized thus: Payette County does not 
include an analysis of plans for future power plant sites and transmission corridors in its 
Comprehensive Plan because current facilities are adequate, but if someone makes an application 
for a power plant or utility corridor, Payette County will consider it under the provisions of its 
Comprehensive Plan-which includes no analysis of, or plans for, future power plant sites and 
transmission corridors. The lack of logic is inescapable. The difficulty Respondents encounter 
in making their argument, of course, is that no matter how one approaches the issue, there is no 
getting around the fact that the County's Comprehensive Plan, both before and after the 
2010 amendment, fails to include any analysis or planning for such facilities. 
As anticipated in H-Hook's Opening Brief, Respondents argue that adoption of a 
comprehensive plan is a legislative act entitled to great deference. Respondents cite to two cases 
in support of that proposition,3 neither of which support the proposition that this Court should 
defer to a county's legislative action in adopting a comprehensive plan which fails to conform to 
the requirements of the applicable statute. In neither case did this court hold that counties are 
free to ignore the requirements of LC. § 67-6508 in adopting their comprehensive plans. This 
Court did, however, clearly resolve the question in Sprenger, Grubb: " ... a valid comprehensive 
plan must contain each of the elements in LC.§ 67-6508." 133 Idaho at 321. 
3 Cooper v. Bd of County Com'rs of Ada County, 101 Idaho 407,614 P.2d 947 (1980); Gay v. 
County Com 'rs of Bonneville County, 103 Idaho 626, 651 P .2d 560 (Ct. App. 1982). 
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Respondents also argue again that there is no requirement in LC. § 67-6508 to designate 
specific power plant sites in a comprehensive plan. H-Hook has never called on the County to 
do so. However, to comply with the statute, some effort must be made to include provisions in 
the Comprehensive Plan to guide the siting of power plants. The Comprehensive Plan should, at 
a minimum, include some analysis of what types of areas are suitable for power plants, what 
other uses might be compatible with power plants, and what infrastructure may be required to 
accommodate power plants. The County has made no effort to do that at all. Instead, the County 
has expressly refused to plan for such facilities. 
There is a wide gulf between a county "micro-managing" power plant siting as 
Respondents warn against and Payette County's adopted policy that power plant site applications 
be considered on a case-by-case, ad hoc basis without any identifiable aforethought. In between 
lies the policy enunciated by the Legislature that a comprehensive plan be adopted which reflects 
the desirable goals and objectives or desirable future situations of the use of land and serves to 
guide and advise the County in its zoning decisions, including concerning the siting of power 
plants. Neither the County's Comprehensive Plan as originally adopted in 2006 or as amended 
in 2010 achieves that policy and neither conforms to the requirements of the applicable statute. 
Payette County's approach refuses to state any goals or objectives or desirable conditions and 
refuses to provide guidance and/or advice to zoning decision makers on the matter of power 
plant siting. Payette County's treatment of planning for power plant sites is not to plan. 
The court in Los-Green, Inc. v. Weber, 156 A.D.2d 994, 548 N.Y.S. 2d 832 (1989), 
clearly recognized that planning must precede rezoning. There, a landowner objected to the 
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rezoning of its land from commercial to residential, arguing that the rezone was not adopted in 
accordance with a comprehensive plan. In ruling for the landowner, the court first noted the 
requirement that amendments to zoning regulations be made in accordance with a comprehensive 
plan and pointed out that the record contained no evidence that prior to the rezoning, the Town 
Board engaged in any study or planning. Accordingly, the court concluded: 
" ... it is clear that some planning must precede rezoning; that the Board 
must give some forethought to the community's land use problems; and that the 
amendment must be consistent with, and further, a specific comprehensive plan. 
Amendments made in piecemeal fashion or by "irrational ad hocery" can11ot be 
sustained." [Internal citations omitted]. 
548 N.Y.S. 2d at 833. The same principle applies here. The principle enunciated in LC. § 67-
6511, that rezones be accordance with a comprehensive plan, is not fulfilled where, as here, the 
"plan" does not, in fact, include any planning. Instead, here, the "plan" not only permits, but 
mandates, decision making on power plant siting in a piecemeal, ad hoc fashion. Such an 
approach is not permitted under LLUP A and should not be sustained by this Court. 
Finally, Respondents invite this Court to adopt the District Court's erroneous conclusion 
that intending to address requests for power plant sites as the requests are made is a general plan. 
That conclusion is contradicted by this Court's rulings that under LC. § 67-6511, a governing 
body asked to make a zoning change must make a factual inquiry to determine whether the 
requested change reflects the goals of and takes into account the factors contained in its 
comprehensive plan. Ferguson v. Bd of County Com 'rs for Ada County, 110 Idaho 785, 787, 
718 P.2d 1223, 1225 (1986); Bone v. City of Lewiston, 107 Idaho 844, 850, 693 P.2d 1046 
(1984). How can the County, under the County's approach as approved by the District Court, 
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make that inquiry in connection with a zone change for a power plant when no such goals are 
stated in its Plan? The answer is that the County cannot. The District's Court approach would 
permit the County to forgo that factual inquiry and should not be approved by this Court. 
Accordingly, Payette County's Comprehensive Plan fails to conform to the requirements 
of LC.§ 67-6508 and is therefore invalid. Consequently, Payette County's Ordinance 2011-03 
rezoning the subject property from Agricultural to Industrial is likewise invalid. 
III. The Rezoning Constitutes Illegal Spot Zoning. 
At outset, it should be noted that Respondents do not dispute (1) that Idaho has 
recognized two types of spot zoning, (2) that Type One spot zoning is a rezoning of property for 
a use prohibited by the original zoning classification, and (3) that Type Two spot zoning is a 
zoning change that singles out a parcel of land for use inconsistent with the permitted use in the 
rest of the zoning district for the benefit of an individual property owner. Respondent's Brief at 
18. Also, there is no dispute that the test for Type One spot zoning is whether the zone change is 
in accord with the comprehensive plan. Id. The disputed issues are whether the zone change 
violates Type One spot zoning and whether it violates Type Two spot zoning. 
A. The Rezone Is Not In Accord with the Comprehensive Plan 
It's important to remember that the County's Comprehensive Plan was not amended until 
AEHI sought to develop the Schwarz Property. Indeed, the property was designated for 
agricultural uses on Payette County's Comprehensive Plan Map, was zoned for agricultural uses 
under Payette County's Zoning Ordinance, and was being used as agricultural grazing land. Ag. 
R. p. 46. As AEHI stated in its application, "[t]oday, the property surrounding the proposed IEC 
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(Idaho Energy Complex) facility is used for agricultural and livestock grazing. The IEC site 
itself is used as pasture for cattle." Ag. R. p. 23. In fact, there is nothing but agricultural land for 
many miles in every direction from the proposed IEC site. Ag. R. p. 4120, 4122, 4200. 
However, because the proposed nuclear power plant could not be built on the Schwarz 
Property while zoned agricultural, AEHI also could not rezone the Schwarz Property for 
industrial uses without first amending the Comprehensive Plan and Plan Map to change the 
designated use from agricultural to heavy industrial. Ag. R. p. 4200. Consequently, it was AEHI 
that instigated efforts to amend the Comprehensive Plan and Map to designate the Schwarz 
Property for industrial uses. Ag. R. p. 93. As is apparent from Respondents' brief, it did so to 
legitimize its attempt to spot zone the property. Such "spot" amending of the Comprehensive 
Plan and Plan Map, does not legitimize illegal spot zoning. 
Indeed, although Respondent's allege that H-Hook "is trotting out a new cause of action," 
the fact is that the principles underlying spot zoning lead to the conclusion that the prohibition on 
spot zoning cannot be avoided by "spot" amending the comprehensive plan to legitimize the spot 
zoning. As this Court stated in Price v. Payette County Bd. Of Comm 'rs, 131 Idaho 426, 958 
P.2d 583 (1998), "if the Board permits a use of a single parcel that is inconsistent with the use 
permitted in the rest of the zoning district, such use is not in accordance with the Comprehensive 
Plan." 131 Idaho 426, 432, 958 P.2d 583, 589 (1998). Here, AEHI sought to amend the 
Comprehensive Plan Map and obtain a rezone of the Schwarz Property for the sole purpose of 
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changing the zoning to heavy industrial to support its purported4 development of a nuclear power 
plant. In essence, it singled out a parcel for a use inconsistent with the permitted use, which, 
according to Price, is, by definition, a use not in accordance with the Comprehensive Plan. 
That spot amending the Comprehensive Plan does not save Respondents' spot zoning is 
demonstrated by the decision in Smith v. Skagit County, 453 P.2d 832 (Wash. 1969). In that 
case, the main issue was whether "in amending the comprehensive plan, interim zoning maps 
and [ zoning] ordinance to zone a large waterfront tract ... for heavy industry ... constituted an 
illegal spot zoning." Id. at 834. Like Idaho, the court noted that Washington recognizes spot 
zoning to be illegal where the rezone "is not in accordance with the comprehensive plan." Id. at 
848-49. The Court then found the rezone to be illegal even though it was accompanied by an 
amendment to the comprehensive plan because it was for the benefit of the aluminum company 
to the detriment of neighboring owners. Id. at 849 ("Therefore, the amendments to the interim 
zoning code, maps and comprehensive plan, purporting to create an industrial zone on Guemes 
Island, are void." (Emphasis added.)) Thus, the concept that illegal spot zoning is still illegal 
spot zoning even when accomplished in conjunction with an amendment to a comprehensive 
plan is not a "new" or "novel" concept. 
Respondents also erroneously suggest that their illegal spot zoning is authorized by 
statute. However, although the Idaho Code allows a plan to be amended and allows a zoning 
4 As set forth in H-Hook's Opening Brief, it is unclear whether AEHI ever intended to build a 
nuclear power plant because the approval it sought may have been part of a stock-fraud scheme. 
See Opening Brief at 2, n.2; S. E. C. v. Alternate Energy Holdings, Inc., No. 1 0-CV-00621-EJL-
REB, WL 1000329 at *5-9 (D. Idaho Aug. 13, 2013). 
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ordinance to be considered for amendment after the plan is amended, it does not authorize illegal 
spot zoning nor does it authorize a plan to be amended for the sole purpose of spot zoning. 
LC. § 67-6511. Changing a plan map designation and rezoning is not authorized when it does 
not meet the overall concept of the plan. Price, 131 Idaho at 432, 958 P.2d at 589. In this case, 
Respondents argue that before their spot zoning actions, the Comprehensive Plan indicated that 
there was no need for power plants because power was adequately supplied and consumption 
was declining. Respondent and Intervenor's Brief, p. 16. In support of the rezone, however, 
Respondents have not cited to a finding that Payette County no longer had an adequate supply of 
power such that an amendment to the Comprehensive Plan was necessary to plan for power 
plants. Instead, the Comprehensive Plan was amended in an attempt to legitimize Respondents' 
spot zoning for the benefit of AEHI. 
Moreover, Respondents do not address the inherent problem with the improper 2010 
amendment to the text of the Comprehensive Plan--that the plan, in application, mandates that 
sites for power plants be spot zoned because it provides no planning for power plants. Ag. R. 
p. 153-154. In other words, as set forth in the Opening Brief, because there are no power plant 
provisions that the rezone can be in accord with due to Payette County's refusal to plan for 
power plants, any rezone to allow for a power plant would be Type One spot zoning. Also, any 
finding that the 2010 amendment to the text of the Comprehensive Plan authorizes the rezone 
must be rejected because so doing would condone Type One spot zoning for power plants due to 
the fact that under that amendment, power plants can be located anywhere. Accordingly, the 
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Court should reverse the District Court's decision and hold that the spot zoning that was 
performed pursuant to the invalid comprehensive plan is improper. 
B. This Court has not Rendered Type Two Spot Zoning a Nullity 
Because Respondents' seek to conflate Type One and Type Two spot zoning, it is 
necessary to review the history of these designations. It appears that this Court first recognized 
two tests for spot zoning in Dawson Enterprises, Inc. v. Blaine County, 98 Idaho 506, 515-16, 
567 P.2d 1257, 1265-66 (1977). Specifically, the Court, quoting 51 A.L.R.2d at 266, stated that 
there were two tests for determining illegal spot zoning: "The most widely accepted tests of 
validity . . . are whether or not the ordinance is in accordance with a comprehensive plan of 
zoning ... and whether or not it is reasonably designed to promote the general welfare, or other 
objectives specified in the enabling statutes, rather than merely to benefit individual property 
owners or to relieve them from the harshness of the general regulation as applied to their 
property." 98 Idaho at 514,567 P.2d at 1265 (emphasis added). Then in Evans v. Teton County, 
139 Idaho 71, 77, 73 P.3d 84, 90 (2003), this Court expressly divided spot zoning into two types 
with the two different tests articulated in Dawson. This Court in Evans, and also in the 
subsequent decision of Taylor v. Canyon County Bd ofCom'rs, 147 Idaho 424, 210 P.3d 532 
(2009), did not express any intention to abrogate, or in any way nullify, Type Two spot zoning. 
Yet, that is exactly the effect of Respondents' argument that Type Two spot zoning does 
not exist when a rezone meets the Type One test of being in accord with the comprehensive plan. 
As explained in the Opening Brief, but ignored by Respondents, their argument and the District 
Court's ruling, make Type Two spot zoning a nullity because under their argument, a zoning 
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decision that meets the Type One test is valid even if it constitutes Type Two spot zoning and if 
the zoning decision does not meet the Type One test, there would be no need to determine the 
zoning decision's validity under the Type Two test because it is invalid under the Type One test. 
Neither Evans nor Taylor, should be read to require such a result. 
In Evans, Teton Springs proposed a large development consisting of a golf course and 
residential resort. As part of the proposal, Teton Springs also sought a zone change, which was 
approved over the objection of neighbors. 139 Idaho at 73-74, 73 P.3d at 86-87. The neighbors 
argued that the zone change from agricultural to residential was spot zoning. Id. at 76, 73 P.3d at 
89. The Court explained the two types of spot zoning and then held that "[t]he Appellants' claim 
of spot zoning need not be addressed because the type one spot zoning in this case is valid." The 
Court's sole analysis was on whether the zone change was in accord with the comprehensive 
plan. Id. The Court did not address whether Type Two spot zoning was at issue in the case and 
did not abrogate Type Two spot zoning or otherwise hold that the only viable claim of spot 
zoning in Idaho is Type One spot zoning. See id. 
In Taylor, Savala's application for a rezone of his property from agricultural to 
commercial was granted over objections by the Vickers that the rezone constituted spot zoning. 
Vickers argued that the rezone was illegal Type Two spot zoning because it singled out Savala's 
property for commercial use in the midst of an agricultural zoning district. 14 7 Idaho at 4 36, 210 
P.3d at 544. The Board argued that the Court "need not address the Vickers' claim of type two 
spot zoning because only type one spot zoning occurred in this case, which is valid." Id. The 
Court reiterated the Evans holding that there are two distinct types of spot zoning in the Idaho 
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with two distinct tests. Id The Court then analyzed whether the zoning met the Type One test 
by being in accord with the comprehensive plan and held that "the Vicker' s claim of spot zoning 
need not be addressed since the type one spot zoning that occurred in this case is valid." Id. 
(Emphasis added.) Thus, the Court agreed with the Board that only type one spot zoning was at 
issue. It did not, however, evince any intention to eviscerate Type Two spot zoning. 
C. The Rezone is Illegal Under the Type One and Type Two Tests 
Even assuming for the sake of argument that in Evans and Taylor this Court intended to 
express a rule whereby there is only one claim of illegal spot zoning and that claim is subject to a 
two-part test, rather than two independent claims of illegal spot zoning subject to separate tests, 
the spot zoning that occurred in this case is illegal under both tests. Said differently, the spot 
zoning that occurred in this case is not in accord with the Comprehensive Plan and singles out a 
parcel of land for use inconsistent with the permitted use in the rest of the zoning district for the 
benefit of an individual property owner. Accordingly, the spot zoning at issue in this case fails 
under both tests. 
As set forth above, it fails under the Type One test because as a result of the County's 
failure to plan, there are no power plant provisions in the Comprehensive Plan with which the 
rezone can be in accord. Likewise, the rezone fails under the Type Two test because the 
Schwarz Property was rezoned to authorize heavy industrial use in the midst of a sea of 
agricultural use for the sole benefit of AEHI. Respondents do not, because they cannot, seriously 
dispute this fact. The best that they could muster was that within miles of the Schwarz Property 
there are four animal feed lots and a landfill. Respondents' Brief at 21. They did not present 
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evidence of any industrial uses in the area, let alone uses compatible with a nuclear power plant. 
Indeed, the Comprehensive Plan Map demonstrates vividly that the rezone singles out a parcel of 
land for use inconsistent with the permitted use in the rest of the zoning district for the benefit of 
AEHI. Ag. R. p. 4065-66. As such, the rezone violates the Type Two test. Consequently, 
because the spot zoning that occurred in this case violates both the Type One test and the Type 
Two test, the District Court's decision upholding the spot zoning should be reversed. 
IV. Due Process Requires that the Development Agreement be Available for Review and 
Comment Sufficiently in Advance of the Public Hearing to Permit a Meaningful 
Opportunity to Comment on It 
As noted in H-Hook's Opening Brief, AEHI's rezone request 1s coupled with a 
development agreement. The development agreement is intended to, among other matters, set 
forth the conditions upon which a rezone might be granted. The development agreement is the 
most critical element of AEHI's application because if the property is rezoned, AEHI or anyone 
else who might acquire the subject property, will have the right to construct a nuclear power 
plant without further zoning action, approval or control by the County, except to the extent that 
right is limited or conditioned by the development agreement. The development agreement 
presents the only opportunity for the County to establish requirements for what AEHI may do 
and may not do in connection with the development of its power plant and presents the only 
opportunity to set forth how the interests of the County and neighboring property owners will be 
preserved and protected. Affecting the content of the development agreement and the conditions 
of approval attached to it is also the one and only way that interested persons, such as H-Hook, 
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can seek to protect themselves and their properties from the detrimental effects of the proposed 
power plant project. 
The proposed power plant project is, quite obviously, large and complex. The application 
filed by AEHI was lengthy and highly technical as was the development agreement. It was 
unreasonable to expect that H-Hook and other interested persons could complete a meaningful 
review and analysis of the development agreement in the few days they had access to it. Here, 
the completed development agreement was not included in the public record for the December 2, 
2010, Planning and Zoning Commission meeting until November 24, 2010, one day before the 
Thanksgiving holiday, two days before the cut-off date for written comment, and just eight days 
before the public hearing. Ag. R. p. 1369-1397. The proposed development agreement, as 
revised after the date of the Planning and Zoning Commission's recommendation for approval, 
was not prepared and made available for review by members of the public until May 26, 2011, 
only 11 days prior to the June 6, 2011, Board of County Commissioners hearing. Ag. R. 
p. 4028-4029. Where critical elements of a land use application are not provided for public 
review and comment sufficiently in advance of a hearing, the very purpose for a public hearing is 
nullified. See, Fischer v. City of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349, 109 P.3d 1091 (2005); Johnson v. City 
of Homedale, 118 Idaho 285, 796 P.2d 162 (Ct. App. 1990). 
Since due process is a flexible concept calling for such procedural protections as are 
warranted by the particular situation (Neighbors for a Healthy Gold Fork v. Valley Cnty., 
145 Idaho 121, 127, 176 P.3d 126, 132 (2007), citing to Cowan v. Bd. of Com'rs of Fremont 
Cnty., 143 Idaho 501, 148 P.3d 1247 (2006)), where, as here, the magnitude of the proposal 
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before the County is so significant, the minimum procedural protections are not enough. Rather, 
the decision making body should be held to a higher standard. The Respondents, however, argue 
for the application of the minimum standards of notice and an opportunity to be heard. 
Respondents ask the Court to conclude that since H-Hook showed up at the hearings and offered 
what comment it could, H-Hook had notice and an opportunity to participate sufficient to meet 
due process requirements. To be sure, H-Hook did appear and present limited testimony to the 
extent that it was able. However, that doesn't mean H-Hook's opportunity was a meaningful 
one. To be meaningful, the opportunity to present evidence requires that the speaker has been 
informed on the matter, a requirement not met where, as here, the most critical element of the 
matter under consideration is released at the last minute. 
A careful review of the record demonstrates the point. Before both the Planning and 
Zoning Commission hearing and the Board of County Commissioners hearing, H-Hook raised 
written objections to the delayed release of the development agreement. Ag. R. p. 3255; 
3670-3672; see also Ag. R. p. 2537-2538. H-Hook's attorney repeated those objections at the 
Planning and Zoning Commission's December 2, 2010, public hearing, without making any 
substantive comment on the development agreement. December 2, 2010, Tr. p. 207-211. At the 
Board of County Commissioners public hearing, a representative from H-Hook read a 1 ½ page 
letter into the record which included four short paragraphs addressing the development 
agreement making two points: (1) the development agreement has a 20-year life over which 
span of time the County had no right to amend or modify it, putting a cloud of uncertainty on all 
real property in the vicinity until the year 2031; and (2) in return, AEHI had no obligation to do 
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anything. June 6, 2011, Tr. p. 98-101. Conspicuously absent are any comments on the substance 
of the development agreement and its conditions of approval. The reason for that absence, as 
H-Hook has consistently argued, is that the development agreement was not made available for 
review and comment sufficiently in advance of the public hearings to permit any meaningful, 
substantive comment. H-Hook's comments on the development agreement are hardly the 
extensive, detailed criticisms as characterized by Respondents' in their Brief. 
Not just any opportunity to present evidence is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of 
due process. Instead, all interested parties must have a meaningful opportunity to present 
evidence to the governing board on salient factual issues. Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 
130 Idaho 923, 927, 950 P.2d 1262, 1266 (1998). Under the circumstances of this case a 
meaningful opportunity to present evidence on the salient factual issues requires that the 
development agreement be available for review and comment sufficiently in advance of the 
public hearing to permit informed comment on it. Release of the revised forms of development 
agreement only a few days before each of the two public hearings prevented that meaningful 
opportunity to make informed comment. 
As anticipated, Respondents also point out that a draft of a development agreement was 
submitted with AEHI' s application, months before the hearings. Respondents fail to mention 
that, as H-Hook points out in its opening brief, the development agreement submitted with 
AEHI's application did not include the most essential part of the development agreement-the 
conditions of approval. In this instance, it is the conditions of approval attached to the 
development agreement that speak to the specific development project under consideration. The 
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body of the development agreement consists primarily of boiler plate type provisions which 
might be applicable to any project. It is the conditions of approval in this particular development 
agreement that address the details of the manner in which the project would be developed, 
especially those issues which were of the greatest importance to neighboring property owners 
like H-Hook (such as the means of access to the project site, the transportation facility 
improvements it required, what public safety services would be required, and others). Without 
the conditions of approval, the development agreement has little meaning. In addition, while 
revised versions of the proposed development agreement were submitted a few days before the 
Planning and Zoning Commission hearing and again before the Board of County Commissioners 
hearing, in neither instance could H-Hook know what changes were being made leaving H-Hook 
"with a dearth of information on whether-and in what regard-to object to the proposal". 
Johnson v. City of Homedale at 287. 
As also anticipated, Respondents persist in their argument that H-Hook has failed to 
demonstrate that its substantial rights have been prejudiced by the Respondents last minute 
release of the development agreement after its various revisions. Respondents suggest that 
whether an alleged notice error violates substantial rights is to be determined by considering 
whether petitioner has the opportunity to participate in public hearings. What Respondents leave 
out of the standard they ask the Court to apply is that due process requires meaningful notice and 
a meaningful opportunity to present evidence. Castaneda, supra. Due process requires an 
opportunity to make informed comment on the matter before the zoning authority, not a 
perfunctory, meaningless opportunity where critical information is withheld until it is effectively 
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too late to do anything with it. Here, H-Hook was expected to absorb hundreds of pages of 
complex information about the most complex development project Payette County has likely 
ever considered and determine if those issues were reasonably and adequately addressed in the 
development agreement in only a matter of a few days. Such an expectation is unreasonable and 
deprived H-Hook of a reasonably fair and meaningful opportunity to present evidence on salient 
issues before the County. That deprivation is a violation of H-Hook's due process rights, which 
are substantial rights. Eddins v. City of Lewiston, 150 Idaho 30, 244 P.3d 174 (2010). 
Respondents nevertheless argue that the County's zoning ordinance does not require a 
development agreement be submitted with an application for a conditional rezone, that 
finalization of a development agreement may be a condition of approval and therefore a 
development agreement need not be made available for review and comment prior to the public 
hearing. However, Payette County's ordinance cannot supplant an interested party's due process 
rights. See, Eddins, supra (application of City's ordinance may not violate a party's due process 
rights) 
There is one thing that H-Hook and the Respondents agree upon. In reviewing the 
decisions of zoning boards, courts are to look at the proceedings as a whole and evaluate the 
adequacy of procedures and the resulting decisions in light of practical considerations with an 
emphasis on fundamental fairness and the essentials of a reasoned decision making. 
I.C. § 67-6535(3). Applying that standard in these circumstances leads to only one conclusion-
the entire process was fundamentally unfair to those, like H-Hook, who question the wisdom of 
siting a nuclear power plant on the Schwarz Property. The failure to make the development 
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agreement, the most important document to be produced in the County's decision making 
process, available a reasonable time before the public hearings, together with the other 
procedural irregularities raised by H-Hook, amply demonstrate the lack of such fundamental 
fairness. In situations such as this, in order to provide a meaningful opportunity to make 
informed comment, a development agreement in its proposed final form must be available for 
review and comment when notice is mailed and published prior to the required hearing. Making 
such an important document available at any later date effectively nullifies the purpose for the 
public hearing. 
V. Respondents are not Entitled to Recover Attorney fees 
Respondents seek an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I. C. § 12-117 and 
Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41. Respondents are not entitled to such an award for the 
following reasons. 
First, although the claim for attorney fees was noted in Respondents' Brief as an 
additional issue on appeal, Respondents did not include any argument or authority in support of 
their claim in the argument portion of their Brief. This Court has previously made clear that it 
will not consider issues raised on appeal, including a claim for attorney fees, which are not 
supported by positions of law, authority or argument. Martin v. Smith, 154 Idaho 161, 296 P .3d 
367 (2013); Goldman v. Graham, 139 Idaho 945, 88 P.3d 764 (2004). 
Second, an award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-117 may only be made to a party which 
1s adverse to a state agency or political subdivision. Neighbors for Responsible Growth v. 
Kootenai County, 147 Idaho 173,207 P.3d 149 (2009). AEHI is not adverse to Payette County 
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in this case. In both this appeal and below, AEHI and the County filed a Joint Brief in which 
both presented the same argument in opposition to H-Hook (and the other Petitioners below). 
And, as this Court noted in Neighbors, id, the fact that AEHI is an Intervenor on the side of the 
County makes obvious that the two are not adverse. Accordingly AEHI is not entitled to recover 
its attorney fees. 
Finally, an award of attorney fees under LC.§ 12-117 is only appropriate where the 
non-prevailing party has acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. H-Hook submits that 
the arguments it makes in this appeal are each grounded in fact and are warranted by existing law 
or a good faith argument for the extension of existing law. If H-Hook does not prevail on this 
appeal, it does not necessarily follow that H-Hook's arguments were unreasonable. See, Martin 
v. Smith supra. 
On the other hand, Respondents have not objected to H-Hook's claim for an award of 
attorney fees if it prevails, apparently conceding the point. 
VI. Conclusion 
The Court should set aside the Board's granting of the conditional rezone requested by 
AEHI for the reason that it was not granted in accordance with a valid Comprehensive Plan, the 
rezone constitutes illegal spot zoning and the proceedings conducted by the County violated 
H-Hook's due process rights. In so doing, the Court should reject Respondents' arguments 
which, if accepted, would permit the County to intentionally and expressly avoid its planning 
duties under LLUP A and severely curtail the ability of neighboring land owners to object to uses 
that are incompatible with the surrounding area. Indeed, a developer of a proposed nuclear 
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power plant should not be permitted to skirt longstanding principles requiring that planning 
precede zone changes and prohibiting spot zoning, through an amendment to a comprehensive 
plan, the effect of which is to allow a nuclear power plant to be built anywhere in the County 
without any prior planning and without any consideration of compatibility with existing uses. 
Instead, in contrast to what happened in this case, some meaningful planning and analysis as 
contemplated by LLUPA must occur prior to any rezoning in order to avoid the natural 
consequence of the refusal to plan - piecemeal zoning decisions made on an ad hoc basis, 
inevitably resulting in zoning changes that single out certain parcels of land for use inconsistent 
with the permitted use in the rest of the area for the benefit of one owner to the detriment of 
neighboring owners, and the county as a whole. Accordingly, to permit Respondents' scheme to 
avoid the required planning in an effort to legitimize spot zoning would be fundamentally unfair 
as it interferes with the right to be free from unreasonable or arbitrary zoning decisions. Also 
fundamentally unfair, is Payette County's failure to provide a meaningful opportunity to 
participate in the decision making process to those who question the granting of a rezone to a 
developer who apparently used the rezone to perpetrate securities fraud. Allowing such a failure 
to stand undermines the clear policy expressed in LLUP A that neighboring property owners be 
permitted to participate in zoning decisions that detrimentally affect their properties. 
DATED this 7th day of May 2014. 
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